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1. Introduction
There is a consensus that higher education graduates must bear the cost of their education
since there are private returns to the beneciaries.4 There is also a consensus that society
must share the cost of investing in higher education because enrolment yields social returns
that transcend the individuals who directly benet from it (Moretti 2004). This double
consensus explains the pervasiveness, in advanced democracies, of cost-sharing models for
funding higher education whereby the cost of education is shared between the beneciaries
and society at large (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Barro 1998; Garcia-Penalosa andWälde
2000; Lochner and Moretti 2004; Bassanini and Scarpenta 2001; Greenaway and Haynes
2003; Barr, 2004; Riddell, 2005). However, for a number of these advanced democracies,
including Canada and the United States, the general consensus ends there. It does not
extend to the thorny issue of how the state should collect the revenue needed to nance
its share of the cost of higher education. Instead, there are divided opinions over which, of
the progressive wage tax system, or the at wage tax system, is more likely to create an
economy with abundance of skilled workers.
On the one hand, there is the presumption that unlike the at tax, the progressive tax
system cannot create the abundance of skills that underlies economic prosperity, because
the higher tax rate levied on the skill-premium in wage acts as a disincentive to invest
in skills (Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998). On the other hand, there is the view that
the alternative at tax system would lead to a regressive income distribution whereby low-
income families that cannot a¤ord to send their children to college subsidize middle-income
and higher-income families who can (Garcia-Penalosa and Wälde, 2000). These di¤erences
of opinions underscore the importance of the requirement that the choice of a tax system for
funding public expenditures be based on a clear understanding of its impact. Yet missing
in the existing literature on public nancing of higher education has been a systematic
assessment of how the tax system a¤ects participation in higher education when (i) the
skills graduates gain are imperfectly aligned with those employers need, and (ii) there is
international mobility of (physical) capital. This article lls this gap, by contrasting the
4By higher education we mean tertiary education leading to an under-graduate or graduate degree.
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impacts of various tax proposals indexed by their degree of tax progressivity.
Under the at wage tax system (i.e., one with tax progressivity of degree zero), the
burden of nancing access to a higher education is equally shared by all wage earners, as
this has to do with the tax rate. In contrast, under tax systems with a positive degree of
progressivity, graduates who get a greater nancial return from their higher education see
the increment in their earning taxed at a higher rate depending upon the chosen degree of
progressivity, thereby raising their share of the burden relative to the other wage earners.
We develop a simple general equilibrium model of enrolment in higher education and labor
supply, with uncertain return on higher education to contrast the performances of these
wage tax proposals. In our model, prospective students are aware of the risk that the skills
they gain through the higher education system are misaligned with those employers need.
This is the only source of uncertainty for the return on higher education.5
We model an individual decision to pursue higher education as one that is determined
jointly by education-related costs, family wealth, and the nancial return on the skills
gained. In the absence of tuition subsidies, enrolment in higher education tracks family
wealth, thereby undermining the principle of equal opportunities. What is more, uncer-
tainty about the return on higher education raises the opportunity cost of education for
risk-averse individuals, and thus may increase inequality, as only individuals from rich fam-
ily backgrounds can draw on family wealth to mitigate the e¤ects of risk-aversion. Poor,
risk-averse individuals would miss out, as they fear that participation in higher education
would leave them saddled with debt.
Our general equilibrium model highlights two channels through which distortionary
taxation impacts individualsdecision on whether or not to pursue higher education. On
5Our assumption that the misalignment between skills gained through a higher education system and
those employers need creates a risk for prospective students is consistent with reality. The higher education
system in Canada is a case in point. See Margaret Wente, "Access or quality our universities cant have
both", published in The Globe and mail, October 31st, 2012; Tavia Grant, "Canadas labour pain: 1.3
million jobless, but not enough skills", published in The Globe and Mail , April 1, 2013; and Gwyn Morgan,
"Radical re-nancing proposal would ease skills shortage", The Globe and Mail, Monday, April 15, 2013).
Indeed, despite having one of the highest rates of university enrolment in the world, in 2011 Canada ranked
second to last among OECD countries in producing graduates with suitable skills for the labour market,
suggesting that the qualications obtained do not always match the needs of the labour market (OECD
2011).
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the one hand, a wage tax reduces the reward from being skilled, and thus tends to create
a disincentive to pursue costly higher education as a skill-imparting mechanism. A pro-
gressive wage tax system reinforces this disincentive in two related ways. First, because
the increase in earnings induced by these skills pushes individuals into higher tax brackets,
it tends to reduce the return on skills gained through higher education, which creates a
disincentive for participation. Second, it tends to raise the importance of family wealth
for participation in higher education because the induced reduction in earnings tends to
restrict gains from participation only to prospective students who require a minimal level
of debt for participation. On the basis of this channel alone, a at wage tax system would
dominate a progressive wage tax system on e¢ ciency grounds, as in Heckman, Lochner
and Taber (1998). But on the other hand, when a fraction of the tax revenue collected
through wage taxation is invested in enhancing access to higher education, for example,
through tuition subsidies, a second channel for the impact of wage taxation on the decision
to pursue higher education opens up, working through the level of tax revenue collected.
To the extent that the progressive tax dominates the at tax from the view point of revenue
generation, it may be better at extending access to prospective students from poor family
backgrounds. Yet tax revenue does not only depend on the tax rate; it also depends on the
allocation of taxpayers across wage brackets, and its impacts (both direct and indirect) on
wages. Because wage taxes are distortionary, they impact the allocation of workers across
wage brackets through the decision on whether or not to pursue higher education. These
complex feedback between taxation, the allocation of workers across wage brackets, wages,
and tax revenue justify our use of a general equilibrium model.
We structure the interactions between the two channels of the impacts of wage taxation
around three key features. First, we consider an aggregate production function such that
abundance of capital raises the productivity of both skilled and unskilled workers. Second,
capital is internationally mobile, and its productivity rises with the abundance of labor
inputs. Third, the structure of this aggregate production function is selected to ensure
that the earnings of skilled workers are always higher than those of unskilled workers. This
has two e¤ects. On the one hand, because skilled workers are more productive than their
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unskilled counterparts, their availability becomes a lever of capital inows. On the other
hand, because skilled workers earn more, they become key contributors to tax revenue. The
more there are skilled workers, the higher the tax revenue. We show that a progressive
wage tax reinforces this revenue e¤ect. We supplement our analysis with a quantitative
assessment of a tax reform underlaid by a switch from a at to a progressive tax. To
do so we use numerical methods to compute the degree of wage tax progressivity that
maximizes the size of the skilled labor force and the level of capital inows. We show that
the quantitative impact on skill formation and capital inows of switching from the at to
the progressive tax varies with the level of e¢ ciency with which higher education imparts
graduates with suitable skills. This impact is negative when the level of e¢ ciency of the
higher education system is low and positive when it is high. In other words, when the level
of e¢ ciency of the higher education system is low, the at tax dominates the progressive
tax as a mechanism for enhancing skill formation and capital inows. The reverse is true,
however, when this level of e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently high.
Higher education nancing is a highly debated issue in advanced democracies such as
Canada and the United States, and both empirical and theoretical studies of this issue exist
(e.g., Coelli 2009; Caponi and Plesca 2009; Burbidge, Collins, Davies, and Magee 2012).
However, we view our work as complementary to existing theoretical works that rely on the
discipline of a general equilibrium model to analyze the e¤ect of public policy on enrolment
in higher education and labor supply. Examples of such works include Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1998), Garcia-Penalosa and Wälde (2000), Caucutt and Kumar (2003), and
Hanushek et al. (2003). Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) build a dynamic general
equilibrium model to explore the impact of alternative tax systems on human capital
formation. In particular, they contrast the performances of three di¤erent tax policy
proposals namely, a progressive wage tax, a at wage tax, and a at consumption tax. In
their model, a wage tax reduces marginal returns on schooling, but has no e¤ects on the
marginal costs of schooling. Unlike the two other tax systems considered, the progressive
wage tax reinforces the negative e¤ects on the marginal returns to education, because
the increase in earnings induced by schooling pushes individuals into higher tax brackets.
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In their model, this is the only channel through which tax policy a¤ects human capital
formation. We complement Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), through the addition of
a second channel for the e¤ect of wage taxes on the decision to pursue higher education,
and the level of e¢ ciency with which higher education system imparts graduates with skills
suitable for the labor market. In particular, we allow tax revenue to be invested in higher
education system in the form of tuition subsidies, based upon documented evidence that
governments in advanced democracies use tax revenue to fund access to education.6
Garcia-Penalosa andWälde (2000) contrast the performances of a at tax, loan schemes,
and a graduate tax in a general equilibrium model of investment in higher education and
labor supply. They show that a at tax is dominated by the other funding mechanisms on
the basis of equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤s. They also show that when the return on higher ed-
ucation is uncertain, and prospective students are risk-averse, a graduate tax out-performs
the loan schemes, making it the best funding mechanism for public nancing of higher
education. It is not clear, however, how this graduate tax will be implemented in reality.
In addition, Garcia-Penalosa and Wälde (2000) abstract away from international capital
mobility, so that unskilled workers in their model do not benet from the abundance of
skilled workers, which explain why in their model, these workers are exempted from con-
tributing to education nancing. In our model, unskilled workers benet from capital
inows because abundance of capital raises labor productivity. Yet, as we show in our
model, it is abundance of workers with suitable skills which enhances capital inows. This
combines with the positive e¤ect of capital inows on unskilled labor wage to justify taxing
the unskilled wage.
Caucutt and Kumar (2003) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of college
attendance and labor supply to contrast the performances of three alternative higher edu-
cation policies, including (i) a tax and subsidy scheme reecting equality of opportunities,
(ii) a policy of maximizing the fraction of people with a college education, (iii) the provision
of merit-based aid to the poor. As in Garcia-Penalosa and Wälde (2000), higher education
in Caucutt and Kumar (2003) only benets those who successfully pursue it and there is
6See, for example, Department of Finance Canada, 2012
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no international capital mobility. They show that the tax-subsidy scheme underpinning
the equal opportunities policy is dominated by the other two higher education policies be-
cause the former maximizes the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤. In particular, they argue that
increased subsidies end up attracting inframarginal students (those with lower abilities) to
college, thereby causing an increase in the dropout rate a waste of education resources.
Our article, however, is not primarily about how to best use public funds; instead, it is
more about how to best raise such funds to nance access to higher education when taxes
are distortionary.
Hanushek et al. (2003) also use a general equilibrium model of college attendance
and labor supply to compare three redistribution schemes, including (i) tuition subsidies
for higher education, (ii) a negative wage tax, (iii) a wage subsidy. Like Garcia-Penalosa
and Wälde (2000), and Caucutt and Kumar (2003), Hanushek et al.(2003) emphasize
heterogeneous abilities and tie the level of uncertainty underlying returns to education to
agentsinnate abilities.7 In this context, they show that tuition subsidies are dominated by
other redistribution schemes on the basis of the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ criterion. They
abstract away from physical capital as an input in the aggregate production function, as
well as from international capital movements. Therefore, as in Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998), Garcia-Penalosa and Wälde (2000) and Caucutt and Kumar (2003), there is
no role for the abundance of workers with suitable skills to benet unskilled workers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
which is solved numerically in section 3. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
7By abstracting from heterogeneous abilities among prospective students, in our model, we do not at
all pretend that abilities do not matter for college performance. Instead, our modelling strategy relies on
two important facts. First, most colleges have admission criteria emphasizing abilities to pursue college
studies. To restrict admission of low ability-students, the government can simply mandate a threshold test
score below which an individual is not admissible to college, as is the case in France and England. Second,
average college tuition di¤ers from one country to another. Some countries like Canada and Germany have
relatively low average tuitions when compared to the United States. However, there is no evidence that
the average college student in Germany or Canada has lower ability than the average college student in
the United States.
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2. Preliminaries
The model emphasizes the role played by the tax system on individualsdecisions to par-
ticipate in higher education (hereafter, HE for short). The basic structure of the model
is a one-period general equilibrium with competitive markets, inspired by Hanushek et al.
(2003). Workers, in total size normalized to unity, have all completed secondary educa-
tion and all have the ability to pursue higher education. There is no learning-by-doing.
Participation in HE is the only mechanism for acquiring productive skills. A worker may
decide to invest in skills by pursuing HE or she may decide to look for a job as an unskilled
worker, when the labor market opens. Training through HE is instantaneous in this one-
period economy, and takes place prior to the opening of the labor market. We introduce
a cost-sharing model whereby the beneciaries of HE bear the costs of their education,
albeit with the help of taxpayerscontributions. We draw from McPherson and Shapiro
(1991), Garcia-Penalosa and Wälde (2000), Keane and Wolpin (2001), Caucutt and Ku-
mar (2003), and Lochner, Belley, and Frenette (forthcoming) in recognizing that higher
education nancing has a strong intergenerational connection to it. To capture this feature
of high education nancing, we assume that each worker has access to a family fund of size
b (for bequest), on which she can draw to help defray HE costs (including tuition, fees,
school supplies, lodging, and other living expenses), but only if she decides to pursue HE.
Prior to entering the labor market, workers make an optimizing choice about the pursuit
of HE for skill-acquisition based upon the tuition charged, their endowment of family fund,
and expected wages. The decision on whether or not to pursue HE involves uncertainty
because the skills gained through HE may or may not be aligned with those employers
need, something which, in our model, is outside the control of prospective students. More
formally, with an exogenous probability q 2 (0; 1), a worker who participates in HE prior
to entering the labor market gains skills that are aligned with those employers need, and
thus gets a skilled job. But with the converse probability 1  q, the education received is
misaligned, in which case she joins the unskilled labor force. We assume that the market
to insure against the misalignment risk is missing. We interpret the probability q as the
level of e¢ ciency with which the HE system imparts workers with skills suitable for the
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labor market.
2.1. HE Cost and Student Debt
For each worker, and in the absence of subsidies, the cost of education is e 2 R+. We
analyze workersaggregate decisions on the pursuit of risky HE under various alternative
tax systems indexed by their degree of progressivity  2 0; . By convention, we denote
as tax system , the tax system whose degree of progressivity is . When  = 0, we have
the at wage tax system. For simplicity, we limit heterogeneity of labor income to two
types only, skilled and unskilled.
Assume that the government subsidizes tuition at a rate z 2 [0; 1], as is the case in
most advanced democracies such as Canadian Provinces. Therefore given the tax system
 chosen by the government, for an agent who decides to pursue HE, the subsidized cost
of HE is given as follows:
E := (1  z) e: (2.1)
The subsidy rate z is determined endogenously by the size of tax revenue under a balanced
budget legislation, and given the degree of progressivity of the tax system, .
To cover her education costs, a typical student relies on two di¤erent sources. The
rst source is the family fund, b  0, and, if not su¢ cient, a second source is a student
loan, extended interest free (just for simplicity) by the government, and repayable after
graduation. For each tax system  implemented by the government, we dene the level of
student debt, d 2 R, as the di¤erence between the (subsidized) level of education costs,
E, and the nancial resources provided by the family, b:
d = E   b:
The level of this student debt is a determining factor of an individuals decision whether
or not to pursue risky HE.
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2.2. Individual Actions and Payo¤s
A worker b is one who has an endowment of family fund, b. Initially, individuals di¤er only
with respect to these endowments. They are distributed across levels of family fund ac-
cording to a cumulative probability distribution function, 	, with strictly positive density,
 (b) := 	0 (b), over a compact support [0; e], where e is the per capita cost of education.
That e is the upper bound of the compact support for family funds means that no worker in
this environment has an endowment of family fund bigger than the pre-subsidy per capita
cost of education, e. Workers have identical preferences over the quantity consumed of the
numeraire, c. The common utility function representing these preferences is given by:
U (c) := ln c: (2.2)
At the opening of the labor market, after workersskill-investment decisions are made, an
individual is either a skilled worker (i = s) or an unskilled worker (i = u). A workers
after-tax income depends on her skill-investment decision, a 2 f0; 1g, and the tax system,
, implemented by the government to raise tax revenue.
Denote as R (a; b; i; ), the realized after-tax income of worker b who, having made the
skill-investment decision a 2 f0; 1g prior to entering the labor market, ends up with a skill-
status i 2 fs; ug, when the governments chosen degree of tax progressivity is  2 0; .
A worker b who makes the decision a = 0 has skill-status i = u with certainty, and thus
earns an after-tax wage given by:
R (0; b; i; ) := (1  )!u ;
where !u denotes the unskilled labor wage under the tax system . In contrast, a worker
who makes the decision a = 1 has skill-status i = u, with probability 1  q, in which case
her realized labor income is
R (1; b; u; ) := (1  )!u ;
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but with the converse probability, q, she has skill-status i = s, in which case her after-tax
wage is
R (1; b; s; ) := (1  )!u + [1  (1 + )  ] (!s   !u ) ; (2.3)
where !s denotes the skilled labor wage, and !
s
   !u , the incremental wage from having
suitable skills under the tax system . Expression (2.3) states that, under the at wage tax
(i.e.,  = 0) the after-tax wage of skilled workers is simply R (1; b; s; 0) := (1  )!s0. As
long as  > 0, the incremental wage from having suitable skills is taxed at a higher rate,
(1 + )  , reecting a marginal tax rate of .
A workers after-tax income, which we specify fully further below, determines her budget
constraint:
c  R (a; b; i; )  ad; (2.4)
where d denotes the level of student debt under the tax system ,
R (a; b; i; ) :=
8>>><>>>:
(1  )!u if a = 0
R (1; b; i; ) if a = 1
: (2.5)
A worker b thus has essentially one important decision to make namely, whether or not
to pursue HE prior to entering the labor market. Combining (2.2), (2.3), (2.5), and (2.4)
yields worker bs realized payo¤ from taking the decision a as follows:
U (a; b; i; ) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
ln (1  )!u  B if a = 0
ln [(1  )!u   d]  C if a = 1 and i = u
ln [(1  )!u + [1  (1 + )  ]    d]  A if a = 1 and i = s
;
(2.6)
where
 := !
s
   !u (2.7)
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is interpreted as the skill premium in wage under the tax system .
A worker b with a realized payo¤ U (0; b; i; )  B is one who elected to pass on the
opportunity to pursue HE prior to entering the labor market. There are 1 n such workers,
where n denotes the measure of HE graduates, under the tax system . A worker b with
a realized payo¤ U (1; b; s; )  A is one who elected to pursue HE prior to entering the
labor market and e¤ectively became a skilled worker upon graduation. By the application
of the law of large numbers, there are S := qn such workers. In contrast, a worker b with
a realized payo¤ U (1; b; u; )  C is one who chose to pursue HE prior to entering the
labor market, but was unfortunate not to acquire suitable skills upon graduation, and thus
had to settle for an unskilled job. The total measure of such workers is (1  q)n, again
by the application of the law of large numbers. Therefore, the size of the unskilled labor
force under the tax system  is 1 n + (1  q)n = 1  qn. A worker bs decision process
on the pursuit of HE is summarized in Figure 1 below:
0=a 1=a
q-1 q
b
qB
qAqC
Figure 1. Worker bs decision tree
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2.3. Tax Progressivity and Gains from Participation in HE
In this sub-section, we explore the determinants of a workers gain from pursuing risky HE.
Dene a real-valued function V : f0; 1g  b;b by (a; ; b) 7! V (a; ; b), where
V (a; ; b) := a [qA + (1  q)C] + (1  a)B;
denotes the expected payo¤of worker b from taking the decision a 2 f0; 1g, prior to entering
the labor market, when the tax system implemented by the government is , and there are,
in total, n 2 [0; 1] workers who made the decision a = 1. Making use of (2.6), we obtain
a reformulation of this expected payo¤ function as follows:
V (a; ; b) =
8>>>><>>>>:
ln [(1  )!u ] if a = 0
ln

(1  )!u + [1  (1 + )  ]    d
(1  )!u   d
q
+ ln [(1  )!u   d] if a = 1
:
(2.8)
The decision on whether or not to participate in HE is made by comparing the expected
payo¤ from participating, V (1; ; b), with the payo¤ from not participating, V (0; ; b).
Let # (; b; q) := V (1; ; b)  V (0; ; b) denote the net expected payo¤ gain to a worker
b from participating in HE prior to entering the labor market. Given , using (2.8),
rearranging, yields this net expected payo¤ gain as follows:
# (; b; q) = ln

(1  )!u   d + [1  (1 + )  ] 
(1  )!u   d
q
  ln

(1  )!u
(1  )!u   d

: (2.9)
Therefore a worker b will choose to participate in HE if and only if her level of family
fund satises # (; b; q) > 0. She will elect to pass on it if and only if # (; b; q) < 0. She
is indi¤erent between the two options if and only # (; b; q) = 0. A number of important
remarks can be derived from (2.9) to give us preliminary insights about the impact of tax
progressivity on skill formation.
Remark 1. There is no incentive to leverage HE for ones social promotion if there is no
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skill premium in wage. In other words, given , the condition
 > 0; (2.10)
is necessary (but not su¢ cient) for a worker to elect to participate in HE.
Remark 2. The net expected payo¤ gain from participating in HE prior to entering the
labor market is strictly increasing in a workers level of endowment of family fund, b:
@
@b
# (b; ; q) > 0:
This remark suggests that workers who gain from participating in HE are those with a
su¢ ciently high endowment of family fund, b. By subsidizing HE, the government therefore
can expand access to it to include individuals from poorer backgrounds.
Remark 3. A higher degree of wage tax progressivity tends to lower the net expected
gain from participating in HE:
@
@
# (; b; q) < 0;
This remark highlights the main criticism of the progressive tax: it tends to create a
disincentive to invest in skills. Furthermore:
Remark 4. The function # (:) is supermodular in (b; ): given q,
@2
@b@
# (b; ; q) > 0;
implying that the incremental net expected payo¤ gain from having a higher endowment
of family fund is larger, the higher the degree of progressivity of the tax system.
This fourth remark states that the progressive tax reinforces the role family income plays
in inuencing the decision to participate in HE: the higher the degree of progressivity of
taxation, the richer the prospective student must be in order to gain from participating in
HE. Overall, Remarks 2-4 suggest that tax progressivity may actually be regressive because
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it tends to bias the gain from participation in HE towards prospective students from richer
family background. However, as can also be seen from (2.9), the above e¤ects are only
a partial equilibrium e¤ects due to the fact that tax revenue collected partially feedback
into higher education, thus opening up additional (indirect) channels for the impact of the
progressive tax on the incentive to participate in HE. Indeed, tuition subsidies lower the
cost of education, thus providing prospective students from poorer family background with
the incentive to participate in HE. Workersaggregate decisions on participation in HE
yield the measure of skill-investors, n 2 [0; 1], of which qn have skills that match those
employers need. We are interested in the impact of tax progressivity on qn, the aggregate
supply of skilled workers.
2.4. Production
As is standard in the macroeconomics literature (e.g., Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 1998;
Caucutt and Kumar, 2003), we assume that the institutional environment in this economy
is characterized by perfectly competitive markets, implying that the prices of labor and
capital services are determined as derivatives of an aggregate production function. Under
the tax system , and at the aggregate level, the numeraire is produced using capital K;
unskilled labor, U , and skilled labor, S, according to a constant return to scale technology:
Y := A (K) [ (S + U) + (1  ) (U + "S)] 1  ; (2.11)
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the capital income share, A > 0 is a measure of total factor
productivity,  > 0, a measure of the relative number of skill tasks created at the aggregate
level,  < 1, a factor determining the level of the elasticity of substitution between the low-
tech process and the high-tech process,  > 0, the relative productivity of unskilled labor
in the high-tech process and " > 0, the relative productivity of skilled labor in the low-tech
process. We make the following assumption, as in Caucutt and Kumar (2003):
A.1. 0 <  < " < 1.
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Assumption A:1 means the following. First, because " < 1, it implies that skilled
workers are not as good as unskilled workers at operating the low-tech production process.
Second, because  < 1, it also implies that unskilled workers are not as good as skilled
workers at operating the high-tech process. Finally, because  < ", Assumption A:1 implies
that it is relatively easier for skilled workers to operate the low-tech process, than it is for
unskilled workers to operate the high-tech process. This assumption may be justied by
the fact that the operation of a high-tech production process usually has high technical
requirements that only suitably skilled workers can fulll, while the operation of low-tech
process requires more manual abilities for which unskilled individuals may be relatively
more suited (Caucutt and Kumar 2003).
Factor use constraints are as follows:
S  S := qn
U  1  S := 1  qn
K  K
where K denotes the global stock of capital, as capital is perfectly internationally mobile
in this environment.
We express market-clearing factor prices and input levels in terms of the chosen degree
of progressivity of the wage tax , under perfect competition:
!s = (1  )A (K) (H)1 
"

 
 S + 
 1
+ " (1  )  1   S 1

 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S
#
(2.12)
!u = (1  )A (K) (H)1 
"

 
 S + 
 1
+ (1  )  1   S 1

 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S
#
(2.13)
r = A
0@   S +  + (1  )  1   S 1
K
1A1  ; (2.14)
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where
H : =


 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S 1 (2.15)
 : = 1  "
 : = 1  ;
and S := qn. Expressions (2.12) and (2.13) implies that a skill premium exists (i.e.,
 > 0) if and only if

 (1  ) >

 S + 
1   S
1 
: (2.16)
Observe that the right-hand side of the inequality (2.16) is strictly increasing in S. We
once again draw from Caucutt and Kumar (2003) to make the following assumption which
guarantees that a skilled worker always earns a higher wage than an unskilled worker in
this environment:
A.2. The parameters , ", , and  satisfy
" >

 (1  )

 1
1 
: (2.17)
Assumption A:2 gives a su¢ cient condition for inequality (2.16) to hold. It guarantees
that skilled workers are always paid a higher wage than their unskilled counterparts in this
environment. In other words, a skill premium always exists.
2.5. Abundance of Skilled labor and Capital Inows
Consider expression (2.14). Since capital is internationally mobile, this expression implies
that capital will continue to ow in until the after-tax domestic rental rate of capital,
(1   k) r, equals the international rate, r: (1   k) r = r, where  k 2 (0; 1) denotes
the at tax rate levied on capital gains. Solving this equation for K yields the level of
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capital inows under the tax system  as follows:
K =

A (1   k)
r
 1
1  

 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S 1     S ; (2.18)
where S denotes the endogenous supply of skilled workers. We then can obtain the partial
derivative of (2.18) with respect to S as follows:
@K
@ S
=
"

 
 S + 
 1    (1  )  1   S 1

 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S
# 
 (1   k)A
r
 1
1 
H;
where H is as dened in (2.15). The above partial derivative is strictly positive if and
only if

 (1  ) >

 S + 
1   S
1 
;
which is guaranteed to hold under Assumption A.2. Hence the following result:
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, an exogenous increase in the supply of
skilled workers, S, causes the volume of capital inows, K, to increase.
Assumption A.2 is su¢ cient for the skill premium in wage to exist (i.e., condition
(2.16) holds) under the tax system . It also gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
abundance of suitable skills to become a driver of capital inows. Therefore, Proposition
1 can be interpreted as suggesting that as long as there is a productivity premium for
skills, and to the extent that HE imparts suitable skills to prospective workers, expanding
access to it can boost national economic performance, measured by the economys ability
to attract foreign capital.
The above notwithstanding, since from expressions (2.12) and (2.13), capital inows
have a positive e¤ect on both skilled and unskilled labor wages (i.e., @!i=@K > 0, i = s; u),
Proposition 1 also implies that HE yields benets that transcend its beneciaries, which,
in turn, may justify public intervention. This can be seen more clearly, by substituting
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(2.18), in (2.12) and (2.13), and rearranging:
!s = A
0@   S +  1 + " (1  )  1   S 1

 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S  1
1A  W s   S ; (2.19)
!u = A
0@   S +  1 + (1  )  1   S 1

 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S  1
1A  W u   S ; (2.20)
where S := qn, and
A = (1  )A

 (1   k)A
r
 
1 
: (2.21)
We prove the following proposition in the Appendix section.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, an exogenous increase in the supply of
skilled workers, S, causes an increase in the level of the unskilled labor wage.
Proposition 2 states that unskilled workers gain from governments expansion of access
to skill-imparting HE. It justies why these workers too must contribute to public funding
of access to HE. The e¤ect of abundance of skilled workers on the skilled labor wage is
rather ambiguous: it may or may not be negative.
2.6. Skill Abundance and Skill Premium
Next, dene ^
 
S

:= W s
 
S
  W u   S to be the skill premium in wage as a function
of the aggregate supply of skilled labor, S. Then, using (2.19) and (2.20), rearranging
terms, we obtain a reformulation of this skill premium as follows:
^
 
S

= A
24   S +  1    (1  )  1   S 1

 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S  1
35 : (2.22)
The skill premium is positive if and only if

 
 S + 
 1    (1  )  1   S 1 > 0;
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which is guaranteed by Assumption A:2. The existence of skill premium in wage formalizes
the private benets generated by higher education, which then justify the claim that ben-
eciaries of HE must bear the cost of their enrolment. We prove the following Proposition
in the Appendix section.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, an exogenous increase in the aggregate
supply of skilled workers, S, causes the skill premium in wage to decrease.
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of demand and supply factors combined with a
xed total population size, which implies that an increase in the aggregate supply of skilled
workers trades o¤ a decline in the aggregate supply of unskilled workers. Note, however,
that even with a xed total population size, Proposition 3 may still fail to hold, for example,
if the relative contribution of the high-tech production process at the aggregate level, , was
allowed to adjust to the supply of skilled workers. This may happen when the abundant
supply of skilled workers induces more rms to operate the high-tech production process,
thereby raising the demand for skilled workers, as in the case of skill-biased technological
change. But we abstract from skill-induced technical change in this article.
2.7. Public Finance
In the previous sub-section, we explained why government funding of access to HE may be
necessary. We also explained why all workers (both skilled and unskilled) must contribute
to public funding of HE. The issue at stake in this article therefore concerns how best
to allocate the tax burden between the two di¤erent categories of workers (skilled and
unskilled). In this sub-section, we characterize tax revenue, as well as the tuition subsidy
rate under alternative wage tax systems. Tax revenue has three sources: (i) unskilled
workers, in total measure 1  S, each with a pre-tax income, W u
 
S

; (ii) skilled workers,
in total measure S, each with a pre-tax income W s
 
S

:= W u
 
S

+ ^
 
S

, where
^
 
S

:= W s
 
S
   W u   S denotes the skill premium under the tax system ; (iii)
capital gains given by rK.
Recall that under the tax system  2 f0; 1g, the rst wage tax bracket is represented by
the unskilled labor wage and taxed at a rate  , while the second and higher labor income
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bracket is represented by the skilled labor wage W u
 
S

+ ^
 
S

. Recall also that the
rst portion of the skilled labor wage (i.e., W u
 
S

) is taxed at a rate  , while the second
portion (i.e., ^
 
S

) is taxed at a rate (1 + )  , where   0 is the measure of the degree
of progressivity of the tax system. Therefore, under the tax system , total tax revenue,
T, can be obtained as a function of the aggregate supply of skilled labor, S.
T = W
u
 
S

+  (1 + ) ^
 
S

S +  kr

 
S
  T^  ; S : (2.23)
By inspection of expression (2.23), it is clear that tax progressivity tends to have a positive
e¤ect on tax revenue: @T^ =@ > 0. Since a share  2 (0; 1) of this tax revenue is allocated
to subsidizing education costs, this opens up a channel through which tax progressivity
can have a positive impact on the rate of participation in HE. We will return to this issue
further below.
Recall that the unskilled labor wage, W u
 
S

, the level of capital inow, 
 
S

, are
all increasing in the aggregate supply of skilled workers, S. However, the skill premium,
^
 
S

, is decreasing in the aggregate supply of skilled labor, which implies that a change
in the level of the latter has two opposite e¤ects on the level of tax revenue, T^
 
; S

, one
positive and the other, negative:
@
@ S
T^
 
; S

= W u0
 
S

+  kr
0
 
S

+  (1 + ) ^
 
S

(1   S)
where
 S =  ^0
 
S
 S
^
 
S

denotes the elasticity of the skill premium, ^
 
S

, with respect to a change in the size of
the skilled labor force, S.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 hold. Then, an exogenous increase in the
aggregate supply of skilled workers causes an increase in the level of tax revenue if
 S < 1: (2.24)
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Condition (2.24) is su¢ cient for the function T^ (; :) to be strictly increasing. It states
that the skill premium is only weakly elastic to a change in the size of the skilled labor
force. Such a condition is likely to hold for an economy open to foreign capital inows,
as these tend to increase the productivity of skilled labor relative to that of the unskilled
labor. When this condition holds, Proposition 4 states that any factor that raises the
aggregate supply of skilled workers in this economy will cause the level of tax revenue to
rise. Therefore, from the view point of the government, expanding access to HE gener-
ates a benet to society in the form of increased tax revenue. This too may provide the
government with a vested interest in expanding access to HE. Next, assume that a share
 of public funds collected through taxation of labor and capital income is allocated to
nancing tuition subsidies. Dene total public expenditures on HE by
Z := zne;
where n denotes the level of enrolment in HE under the tax system . Therefore, assuming
that the government operates under a balanced budget legislation, the subsidy rate, z, is
solution to the equation
zne = T^
 
; S

; (2.25)
all . In other words, using the fact that S := qn, it follows that the subsidy rate, z,
solves:
z = q
T^
 
; S

e S
   ; q; S ; (2.26)
where T^
 
; S

is as dened in (2.23).
We established in Proposition 4 above that T^ (; :) is an increasing function of S.
Therefore, expression (2.26) suggests that an exogenous change in the level of the aggregate
supply of skilled workers has to opposite e¤ects on the tuition subsidy rate, z, one positive
and the other negative. Which one of the two dominates the other, unfortunately does not
have a clear calculus answer.
Finally, we turn to the level of a student debt, d = E   b. From (2.1), substituting
in (2.26), rearranging, leads to a reformulation of the level of student debt as a function of
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the aggregate supply of skilled workers:
D
 
; q; S

= (e  b)  qT^
 
; S

S
; (2.27)
where D
 
; q; S
  d. Expression (2.27) illustrates the role played by tuition subsidies
in enhancing participation in HE. The rst term of this expression, (e  b), is the level of
debt that worker b would have accumulated due to participation in HE in the absence of
tuition subsidies. Tuition subsidies reduce this debt by qT^
 
; q; S

= S, thus providing
worker b with the incentive to participate in HE. However, given, , the magnitude of this
reduction depends on (i) the degree of tax progressivity, , (ii) the level of e¢ ciency of the
HE system as measured by q, (iii) the aggregate supply of skilled workers, S. Just as in
the case of the tuition subsidy rate, 
 
; q; S

, an exogenous change in the level of the
aggregate supply of skilled workers has two opposite e¤ects on the level of student debt,
D
 
; q; S

, one positive and the other negative. Hence the following result, which can be
obtained by partially di¤erentiating (2.27) with respect to S:
Proposition 5. Let
w S : = W
u0   S S
W u
 
S

K S : = 
0   S S

 
S

denote the elasticities of the unskilled labor wage and the level of capital inows, respec-
tively, with respect to a change in the level of the aggregate supply of skilled workers.
Under Assumptions A:1 and A:2, if
w S < 1 (2.28)
and
K S < 1; (2.29)
then an increase in the participation rate in HE (as proxied by an exogenous increase in
the aggregate supply of skilled workers) causes the average level of student debt to rise.
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The reverse is true if w S > 1, K S > 1, and
 S <
W u
 
S

(w S   1) +  kr
 
S

(K S   1)
 (1 + ) ^
 
S

S
:
Conditions (2.28) and (2.29) state that the skilled labor supply elasticities of the un-
skilled labor wage and capital inows are moderate. Proposition 5 states that an increase
in the aggregate supply of skilled workers has an ambiguous e¤ect on the level of student
debt. The sign of this e¤ect depends on the levels of elasticities for the unskilled labor
wage, the skill premium, and the level of capital inows respectively. A highly elastic skill
premium tends to cause this e¤ect to be positive, while highly elastic capital inows and
unskilled labor wage tend to make it negative.
Furthermore, as D
 
; q; S

is strictly decreasing in q, the level of e¢ ciency with which
the HE system imparts skills that match those required by the skilled labor market becomes
a key factor not only in terms of raising the likelihood that a graduate will earn a nancial
benet from the skills she acquired, but also in terms of reducing the debt she has to
repay for participating in HE. Arguably, whether or not tax progressivity enhances skill
formation depends on whether or not the HE system is su¢ ciently e¢ cient at imparting
skills that match those employers need. Our general equilibrium analysis makes this point
below.
3. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we set the stage for the computation of the equilibrium of this small
economy. This will provide the framework for contrasting the performances of the tax
systems. Essentially, given the tax system  implemented by the government, the existence
of an equilibrium of this environment hinges upon the existence of a cut-o¤ level of family
fund, b 2 [0; e] such that a worker with a level of private fund equal to this threshold has a
net expected payo¤ gain from pursuing HE equal to zero. In what follows, we rst discuss
the existence of an equilibrium in this environment.
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3.1. Existence of Equilibrium
We focus on an interior equilibrium, i.e., one where b 2 (0; e). Consider the net payo¤
gain in (2.9). To complete the specication of this net payo¤, we need to (i) compute and
substitute in the level of student debt under each alternative tax system, (ii) substitute in
wages as well.
Therefore, from (2.9), substituting in (2.19), (2.20), and (2.27), rearranging, yields a
reformulation of the net expected gain from pursuing HE as a follows:
#
 
; b; q; S

= q ln  
 
; b; S
  ln   ; b; S (3.1)
for all  2 0; , where
 
 
; b; q; S

: =
(1  )W u   S  (e  b) + qT^   S   S 1 + [1  (1 + )  ] ^   S
(1  )W u   S  (e  b) + qT^   S   S 1

 
; b; q; S

: =
(1  ) W u   S
(1  ) W u   S  (e  b) + qT^   S   S 1 ;
where #
 
; b; q; S
  # (; b; q). Note that since # (; b; q) is di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing in b, therefore, by construction, #
 
; b; q; S

is also di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing in b. Therefore an interior equilibrium exists if and only if
0 2 (#  ; 0; q; S ; #  ; e; q; S):
In other words, the following conditions must be simultaneously satised:
(i) #
 
; 0; q; S

< 0
(ii) #
 
; e; q; S

> 0
Since
lim
b!e

 
; b; q; S

< 1 and lim
b!e
 
 
; b; q; S

> 1;
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it follows from (3.1) that
lim
b!e
#
 
; b; q; S

= #
 
; e; q; S

> 0:
This implies that condition (ii) above is always satised.
In contrast, an inspection of expression (3.1) suggests that the sign of
lim
b!0
#
 
; b; q; S

= #
 
; 0; q; S

is ambiguous. To the extent that (e; q; ) can be chosen so as to satisfy #
 
; 0; q; S

< 0,
we can claim that there exists a cut-o¤ level of family fund, b 2 (0; e), such that:
8b < b; #
 
; b; q; S

< 0
8b > b; #
 
; b; q; S

> 0;
and
#
 
; b; q; S
  0: (3.2)
where
b := B
 
; q; S

(3.3)
all . With the threshold b, thus characterized, we can next obtain the measure of workers
who choose not to pursue HE as 	 (b), using the cdf for the distribution of workers across
endowments of family funds. Since the total measure of workers is 1, the measure of those
who elect to participate in HE is
n = 1 	 (b) :
Note then that since S = qn, the above equation can be reformulated as follows, using
(3.3):
S = q
 
1 	 B  ; q; S ; (3.4)
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which therefore is a xed point problem, since S 2 [0; 1] and q
 
1 	 B  ; q; S 2
[0; 1].
We can then dene an equilibrium of this small economy as (i) a cut-o¤ level for the
endowment of family fund, b, (ii) the level of supply of workers, S

 , such that given (; q):
(i) given S , b

 solves (3.2);
(ii) S is solution to (3.4).
The existence of S can be established using Brouwers xed point theorem. But we
also want this xed point to be unique. Unfortunately, expression (3.4) suggests that
monotonicity cannot be directly veried by partially di¤erentiating 	

B
 
; q; S

with
respect to S. To fully characterize the equilibrium, and therefore complete our analysis,
we simulate the model using numerical methods.
3.2. Model Simulation
We use numerical algorithms (available upon request) to fully characterize the model. The
main technical issue that concerns us in this numerical simulation is whether the model
indeed admits a unique equilibrium. For the purpose of the simulation exercise, we dene
an equilibrium as a system of two equations in two unknown b and S. The two equations
are (3.2) and (3.4). We follow four steps in simulating the model.
Step 1. Given
 
; q; S

, compute the threshold family fund, b, such that any worker
with an endowment of family fund above that threshold gains from pursuing HE.
Step 2. Given a cut-o¤ b := B
 
; q; S

, and by postulating a uniform distribution, we
obtain the equilibrium supply of skilled workers as follows:
S = q
"
e B  ; q; S
e
#
: (3.5)
Step 3. We use (3.5), in combination with (2.18), and (2.27) to compute (i) the equilibrium
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level of capital inows, K, (ii) the average level of student debt dened as
d =
1
n
Z e
b
 
(e  b)  qT^
 
S

S
!
 (b) db: (3.6)
Step 4. We then present our results in a series of graphs representing each of the relevant
endogenous variables as a function of the degree of wage tax progressivity , and the
degree of alignment of the skills gained through HE with the requirements of the
labor market, q.
3.2.1. Parameter Values
An important exercise in the simulation process is the computation of the equilibrium
cut-o¤ level of family fund, b. A number of parameters are involved in the numerical
computation of this cut-o¤. They include the relative contribution of the high-tech process,
, the determinant of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, ,
the capital income share, , the total productivity factor, A, the relative productivity of
unskilled labor in the high-tech process, , the relative productivity of skilled labor in the
low-tech process, ", the global stock of capital, k, the international rental rate of capital, r,
the share of public funds allocated to tertiary education expenditures by the government,
, the tax rates  and  k, the degree of tax progressivity , the cost of education, e, the
level of e¢ ciency with which the HE system imparts graduates with skills that match those
employers need, q. Of all these parameters, only k; q, and  are specic to our model.
We set the capital income share to  = 0:4, consistent with empirical evidence reveal-
ing that this share falls in the range 0:2   0:4 (Gollin, 2002). Also consistent with the
macroeconomics literature (e.g., Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Andolfatto et al. 2004; Dib et
al. 2008), we set r = 1:04. We also set the level of total factor productivity, A, equal
to 1. Van Beveren (2012) nds that the level of total factor productivity is in the range
1:06   2:47. We follow Caucutt and Kumar (2003) in choosing the values of " and e: In
particular, like them we set " = 0:1, e = 0:06. However, since unlike theirs, our model
includes physical capital, we set  = 0:04 and  = 0:85, so that Assumptions A:1 and A:2
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simultaneously hold. Corresponding gures for Caucutt and Kumar (2003) are  = 0:02
and  = 0:5. Furthermore, we set  = 0:32. This corresponds to an elasticity of substitu-
tion between skilled workers and unskilld workers of 1:47, well within the range 1:4   1:5
identied by Auter et al. (1998). We draw from an OECD report on education to set the
average share of public funds allocated to tertiary education expenditures among OECD
countries, , at 0:05.8 We follow Heckman, Lockner and Taber (1998) in setting  k = 0:15.
We set  = 0:085, which is closer to the base rate set by many countries including Canada
and the United States. Finally, we normalize the global stock of capital, k, to unity.
As for  and q, we specify a range for each. We set the feasible range for the degree of
wage tax progressivity, ; to be the unit interval [0; 1]. Just to recall,  = 0, corresponds to
the at wage tax system. A value of  equal to unity corresponds to a marginal tax rate of
100% on the incremental wage from being a skilled worker. Any marginal tax rate beyond
this level would seem anything but reasonable. We set the range of q such that the cut-o¤
endowment of family fund, b, lies in the interior of its range, [0; e].
The following table gives a summary of the parameter values:
8See OECD, 2009. Education at a Glance (2009): OECD Indicators
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Capital share  0:4
International rental rate r 1:04
Measure of total factor productivity A 1:
Elasticity of substitution =
1
1   = 1:47  0:32
Measure of the relative contribution of the high-tech process  0:85
Relative productivity of unskilled labor in the high-tech process  0:04
Relative productivity of skilled labor in the low-tech process. " 0:1
The range for the family fund b [0; e] [0 0:06]
Income tax rate  0:085
Degree of tax progressivity  [0; 1]
Capital tax rate  k 0:15
The share of Tax Revenue allocated to HE  0:05
The cost of education e 0:06
Range for the quality of higher education q 0:45; 0:55; 0:65; 0:75
Using the above parameter values, we compute all equilibrium variables. We particu-
larly single out, the size of the skilled labor force, S , the level of capital inows, K

 , the
level of average student debt, d, and the level of tax revenue, T


3.2.2. Wage Tax Progressivity and The Size of The Skilled Labor Force
Our model economy is closed to migration. Therefore any change in the size of the skilled
labor force has its source in the changes in the allocation of workers by skill status. To
explore the e¤ects of wage tax progressivity on skill formation, we compute the equilibrium
supply of the skilled workers, S , for each degree of wage tax progressivity,  2 [0; 1], and
for di¤erent level of e¢ ciency of the HE system.
Figure 1 below contains 4 graphs. In each of them, the horizontal axis represents the
degree of progressivity of the wage tax system, . An increase in  along the horizontal
axis corresponds to an increase in the degree of progressivity of the wage tax system. The
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vertical axis represents the equilibrium supply of skilled workers, S . Each of the four
graphs corresponds to a di¤erent level of e¢ ciency with which the HE system imparts
workers with skills suitable for the labor market, q.
Figure 1
The higher q, the higher the level of e¢ ciency with which the HE system imparts skills
that employers need.
On the upper-left graph in Figure 1, the equilibrium supply of skilled workers is plotted
in the context where only 45% of HE graduates gain skills that are suitable for the skilled
labor market (i.e., q = 0:45). On the upper-right graph, the supply of skilled workers is
plotted in the context where 55% of HE graduates gain skills that are suitable for the labor
market (i.e., q = 0:55). On the bottom-left and the bottom-right graphs, the corresponding
gures are 65% and 75%, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that the shape of the curve representing the equilibrium supply of skilled
workers varies with the level of e¢ ciency of the HE system, q, becoming increasingly Hump-
shaped as e¢ ciency rises. This is because the degree of tax progressivity that maximizes
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the supply of skilled workers varies with the level of e¢ ciency with which the HE system
imparts skills that are suitable for the market, q. At a level of e¢ ciency of the HE system
q = 0:45, the equilibrium supply of skilled workers ( S) reaches its maximum at a degree
of wage tax progressivity  = 0, corresponding to a at tax. At this level of e¢ ciency,
therefore, the at tax dominates the progressive tax as a mechanism for enhancing skill
formation. Raising this level of e¢ ciency from q = 0:45 to q = 0:55 (an increase of
about 22%) does not change the ranking of the two tax system because the degree of
progressivity that maximizes the equilibrium supply of skilled workers is unchanged at
 = 0, as illustrated on the graph in the upper-right corner of Figure 1. However, this 22%
increase in the level of e¢ ciency of the HE system raises the equilibrium supply of skilled
workers by about 54%.
In contrast, starting from a level of e¢ ciency q = 0:55, if we counterfactually increase
this level of e¢ ciency by 18% to move it up to q = 0:65, causes the degree of progressivity
that maximizes the supply of skilled workers to become positive at  = 10% (see lower-left
graph of Figure 1), leading to a 46% increase in the equilibrium supply of skilled workers
(from 0.3555 on the upper-right graph of Figure 1 to 0.52 on the lower-left graph). This
counterfactual increase in the level of e¢ ciency of the HE system reverses the ranking of
the two tax systems, as the progressive tax now dominates the at tax as a mechanism for
enhancing skill formation.
Moving the level of e¢ ciency of HE from q = 0:65 to q = 0:75 not only reinforces the
superiority of the progressive tax, but, in addition, it raises the degree of tax progressiv-
ity that maximizes the equilibrium supply of skilled workers by 140% (from  = 10% to
 = 24%). Figure 1 therefore shows that the degree of tax progressivity that maximizes the
supply of skilled workers rises with level of e¢ ciency with which the HE system imparts
skills that match those employers need, q. In other words, the quality of HE, as measured
by the level of e¢ ciency with which the HE system imparts suitable skills, is an important
mediator of the impact of wage tax progressivity on skill formation. Countries that use
a progressive wage tax system as the instrument for nancing public expenditures must
therefore ensure that whenever higher education is relied upon as a skill accumulation
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mechanism, the skills it imparts are closely aligned with the skills employers need, other-
wise, this tax system would undermine the development of a skilled labor force. In that
sense, Figure 1 can also be interpreted as suggesting that a misaligned higher education
system may be the source of the criticism directed at the progressive tax system.
3.2.3. Tax Progressivity and The Equilibrium Level of Capital Inows
We argued in Proposition 1 above that the availability of workers with suitable skills is
essential for attracting foreign capital. Furthermore, because labor productivity rises with
abundance of capital inows, in equilibrium, this positive association impacts the supply of
workers with suitable skills through the aggregate of individualsdecisions to pursue HE.
Since taxation is distortionary in this environment, it impacts the interactions between
the aggregate supply of skilled workers, the inow of foreign capital, and wages for skilled
workers and unskilled workers. In this sub-section, we are interested in how the chain of
interactions generated by a change in the degree of progressivity of the wage tax system
impacts the equilibrium level of capital inows, under alternative specications of the level
of e¢ ciency of the HE system. To simulate the equilibrium level of capital inows, we
rst compute b, for each . Then we plug the result in (3.5) to obtain the equilibrium
aggregate supply of skilled workers, for each , which, in turn, is plugged back into (2.18)
to obtain the equilibrium level of capital inows, K.
Figure 2 below plots the equilibrium level of K against the degree of progressivity of
the wage tax system, , for four di¤erent levels of q.
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Figure 2
Compared to Figure 1, Figure 2 conrms the co-movement between the aggregate supply
of skilled workers, S, and the level of capital inows, K. The wage tax system that maxi-
mizes S also maximizes K. When q is set at 0:45 or 0:55, capital inows are maximized at
a degree of progressivity  = 0, implying the superiority of the at tax over the progressive
tax, as mechanism for attracting capital inows. The reverse is true, however, when the
level of e¢ ciency is raised at 0:65 or 0:75. This gure suggests that wage tax progressivity
is bad for capital inows only when the higher education system that is invested with the
task of imparting suitable skills is misaligned with the labor market. Redressing this mis-
alignment is necessary and su¢ cient for the progressive tax to dominate the at tax as a
mechanism for attracting capital inows.
3.2.4. Tax Progressivity and Skill Premium
In our above discussion of the skill premium, Proposition 3 establishes that abundant
supply of skilled workers reduces the skill premium. Therefore, any exogenous factor that
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causes the supply of skilled workers to increase will have a negative e¤ect on the skill
premium. Figure 3 below plots the equilibrium skill premium against the degree of tax
progressivity, , for four di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency of the HE system, q.
Figure 3
The shape of the curve representing the skill premium varies with the level of e¢ ciency
of the HE system, becoming increasingly U-shaped as e¢ ciency rises. In particular, when
the HE system is relatively ine¢ cient at imparting skills that match those employers need,
as in the case where q = 0:55 or lower, the skill premium is minimized under a at tax
system (i.e.,  = 0), implying that a at tax is relatively more e¤ective than the progressive
tax at achieving a more equal distribution, on the basis of pre-tax wages. However, when
the level of e¢ ciency of the HE system is counterfactually raised to q = 0:65, the skill
premium achieves its minimum at the point where the marginal rate of taxation is strictly
positive at  = 10%. The superiority of the progressive tax on equity ground is further
enhanced when the level of e¢ ciency of the HE system is raised to q = 0:75. At that level,
the skill premium is minimized by a progressive tax system that exhibits a 24% marginal
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tax rate, as can be seen in the bottom-right graph of Figure 3. This implies that there
exists a threshold level of e¢ ciency of the HE system above which the progressive tax is
more e¤ective than the at tax at enhancing distributional equity on the basis of pre-tax
wages, and below which the reverse is true.
3.2.5. Wage Tax Progressivity and Average Student Debt
According to a Statistics Canada Report published in 2010, the average debt of students at
graduation, was $18,800 in Canada.9 Research in the area of student loans has been focused
on loan repayment di¢ culties (e.g., Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu 2013) often
relating debt burdens to a decrease in public funding of access to HE. Missing in this
literature is an exploration of the role played by an increase in the rate of participation in
HE and average student debt. The analysis we provide below explores this link.
Figure 4 below plots the average student debt, d, against the degree of wage tax
progressivity, , for four di¤erent values of the degree of alignment of the skills gained
through HE with those employers need, q.
9See May Long, 2010. The Financial Impacts of Student Loans. Statistics Canada, catalogue No
75-001-X.
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Figure 4
In all four graphs of Figure 4, the average student debt is maximized at the degree of
wage tax progressivity for which the aggregate supply of skilled workers is the highest. This
corresponds to a at wage tax system for levels of HE e¢ ciency of respectively q = 0:45 and
q = 0:55, and to a progressive wage tax system for q = 0:65 and q = 0:75. When combined
with Figure 1, Figure 4 suggests that an increase in the rate of participation in HE causes
the average student debt to rise. The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward.
An increase in public funding to HE raises the prospects for higher tuition subsidy rates.
This provides students from poorer family backgrounds (those who require higher levels
of student loans in order to participate) with the incentive to pursue higher education. In
equilibrium, proportionately more such students enroll in HE, thereby causing the average
student debt at graduation to rise.
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3.2.6. Tax Progressivity and Tax revenue
Tax revenue depends on the tax system , on factor prices, and on the allocation of workers
across skill-status. We argued above that when a fraction of tax revenue is used to subsidize
tuition, this opens up an indirect channel through which progressive taxation can impact
skill formation. However this depends on whether tax revenue is higher or lower under the
progressive tax than under the at tax. Figure 5 below plots the equilibrium tax revenue,
T  against the degree of progressivity of the wage tax system , for four di¤erent levels of
e¢ ciency of the HE system as measured by q.
Figure 5
In all four graphs of Figure 5, an increase in the degree of tax progressivity causes the
level of tax revenue to increase. This implies that a progressive tax is better at raising tax
revenue than a at tax. If we only look at the degree of tax progressivity that maximizes
the aggregate supply of skilled workers, Figure 5 combines with Figure 1 to show that
an increase in the aggregate supply of skilled workers raises the level of tax revenue, as
demonstrated in Proposition 4.
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4. Concluding Remarks
This article develops a general equilibrium model of enrolment in higher education and
labor supply in an environment where the return to higher education are uncertain and
capital is international mobile. The model was numerically simulated to provide us with a
sensible basis for comparing alternative tax systems for funding access to higher education.
In particular, we use this model to contrast the performances of the progressive wage tax
system and the at wage tax system. We show that the quantitative impact on skill
formation and capital inows of switching from the at to the progressive tax varies with
the level of e¢ ciency with which the higher education system imparts graduates with
suitable skills. This quantitative impact is negative when the level of e¢ ciency of the
higher education system is low and positive when it is high. In other words, when the level
of e¢ ciency of the higher education system is low, the at tax dominates the progressive
tax as a mechanism for enhancing skill formation and capital inows. The reverse is true,
however, when this level of e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently high.
The key mechanism underlying the quantitative impacts of the progressive tax has three
main elements namely, (i) the negative impact wage taxation has on the reward from being
a skilled worker, (ii) the positive e¤ect progressive taxation has on tax revenue, part of
which is used to reduce the cost of participating in higher education, (iii) the mediating role
played by the level of e¢ ciency with which the higher education system imparts graduates
with skills suitable for the market. We structured the interactions between the two opposite
e¤ects (i) and (ii) as taking place in an environment where labor productivity is enhanced
by the level of capital inows, skilled and unskilled workers are imperfectly substitutable
at the aggregate level, and uncertainty about the return on higher education stems from
the imperfect alignment of the skills it imparts to graduates and those employers need.
When interpreting the predictions of our model, one should keep in mind that our focus
on labor income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers led us to abstract from
a number of other features of the real world. For instance, our model assumes that there
is no international mobility of labor, skilled or unskilled. Taking emigration/immigration
into account, however, may not necessarily alter our ranking of the two tax systems. For
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example, while a progressive tax may act as a push-factor for skilled emigration, if it drives
the return to skills below its international level, it may act as a pool factor for unskilled
immigration, if it raises the domestic return to unskilled labor above its international level.
It is not clear, in a general equilibrium how individuals decision on whether or not to pursue
higher education will be impacted. Likewise, while a at tax may act as a pool-factor for
skilled immigration, it may also act as a push-factor for unskilled emigration. Again, it
is not clear, in a general equilibrium, how this will impact participation rates in higher
education. Furthermore, emigration/immigration entails costs to migrants due to frictions
in the search for overseas employment opportunities. These costs may or may not di¤er by
skill status, further blurring the picture of the ranking of these two alternative tax systems.
5. Appendix
In this section, we provide the proofs of some of the results.
5.1. Proof of Proposition 2
In this sub-section, we provide the proof of Proposition 2. Our main claim is as follows:
given ,
d W u
d S
> 0:
To prove this claim, di¤erentiate expression (2.20) with respect to S, rearranging terms,
to get:
d W u
d S
= A (1  )
h

 
 S + 
 1    (1  )  1   S 1iNuP
D2
  A (1  )
h

 
 S + 
 2    (1  )  1   S 2i
D
(5.1)
where D and Nu denote, respectively, the denominator and the numerator of expression
(2.20), and
P :=


 
 S + 

+ (1  )  1   S 1 : (5.2)
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D, Nu, and P are all strictly positive. The derivative in (5.1) is an algebraic sum of two
terms. Observe that the di¤erence 
 
 S + 
 2  (1  )  1   S 2 is non-positive
if and only if

 (1  ) 

 S + 
1   S
2 
: (5.3)
Therefore, since by Assumption A:1 unskilled workers are less productive than skilled
workers in the operation of the high-tech production process, choosing   the relative
productivity of unskilled workers in the operation of the high-tech process su¢ ciently
small ensures that inequality (5.3) holds, which, in turns guarantees that the second terms
of (5.1) is non-negative.
Next, consider the di¤erence 
 
 S + 
 1    (1  )  1   S 1 in the rst term
of (5.1). It can be shown that this di¤erence is strictly positive if and only if

 (1  ) >

 S + 
1   S
1 
;
which is guaranteed under Assumption A:2. Therefore, the rst term of (5.1) is strictly
positive since  < 1. Hence the result. This completes the proof.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 3
To prove this proposition, we di¤erentiate expression (2.22) with respect to S and re-
arrange terms to get:
d
d S
^
 
S

=  (1  ) ^
 
S

 S + 
242+ 2 (1  ) R   S 2
   (1  ) R   S 1  
h
   (1  ) R   S 1i
+ (1  ) R   S
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where
R
 
S

:=
1   S
 S + 
:
Since  < 1, this derivative is negative if and only if
2+ 2 (1  ) R   S 2
   (1  ) R   S 1 >
h
   (1  ) R   S 1i
+ (1  ) R   S :
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Since  < 1, this inequality can be shown to reduce to
2

R
 
S

+ 2

R
 
S
 2
+ 2

R
 
S
 1
> 0;
which is unambiguously positive. Hence the result. This completes the proof.
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